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When do campaign contributions matter? this article advances the claim 
that a group that gives campaign contributions to us Members of Congress is 
more likely to achieve legislative success when (1) a single legislator can deliver to 
the group (2) a private benefit (3) without attracting negative attention. using an 
original data set based on the written comments of nearly 900 interest groups lob-
bying the us senate Finance Committee on health reform legislation in 2009, i 
link group requests to corresponding legislation. the analysis shows a significant 
relationship between lobby groups’ campaign contributions and their legislative 
success, and at distinct units of analysis—the group, the side, and the group-sen-
ator dyad. the relationship is particularly strong in predicting senators’ amend-
ments in committee. the rare data presented here offer compelling evidence that 
interest groups’ legislative victories are sometimes connected to campaign contri-
butions in a way that previous studies could not identify.
a long line of research provides surprisingly little evidence 
that interest groups consistently use money to secure policy out-
comes. a major reason for this failure is the lack of observable 
data. Campaign contributions and lobbying disclosure reports do 
not go far enough to expose relationships between groups’ politi-
cal spending and actions taken by legislators. it is quite challeng-
ing, for example, to link donations from individual Washington 
lobbyists to the interest group clients these lobbyists represent. 
Moreover, specific details about what lobby groups want, as well 
as the contents of what i call microlegislation—small pieces of bill 
drafts and amendments that benefit a narrow set of interests—
are quite difficult to come by (Burstein 2014). the constant drive 
for reelection makes politicians risk averse, and as such they as-
siduously avoid the appearance of corruption. For lobbyists, their 
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reputations are paramount, and their continued access to politi-
cians requires sharing legislators’ political concerns. as a result 
of these technical and intentional challenges, identifying relation-
ships between contributions and legislators’ actions on contribu-
tors’ behalf  is notoriously difficult (see literature reviews by, e.g., 
Baumgartner and Leech 1998; smith 1995; stratmann 2005).
However, consideration by the us Congress in 2009 of the 
health reform legislation that became “Obamacare” presents a 
unique opportunity to analyze data that link campaign contri-
butions and legislative actions more closely than is usually pos-
sible. in deliberate contrast to the exclusive way in which Bill and 
Hillary Clinton’s health reform proposal was drafted in 1993, con-
gressional democrats and Barack Obama pledged to write health 
reform legislation in a transparent, collaborative way. this com-
mitment, along with a new law requiring registered lobbyists to 
report directly to the House and senate their personal federal cam-
paign contributions (in addition to long-required disclosure of 
contributions from political action committees or PaCs), yields an 
exceptional opportunity to evaluate documents and information 
about possible links between lobby groups’ preferences, legislative 
actions, and lobbyists’ contributions.
Having generated quantitative data from uncommon data 
sources, i model the data at multiple levels of analysis while con-
trolling for important alternative factors. the results are consistent 
with the theory advanced that lobbyists’ contributions and legisla-
tive favors are more likely to be related when a legislator can offer 
to a group a private benefit under minimal scrutiny. specifically, the 
data suggest that (1) lobbyists who make contributions to senators 
on the key committee writing health reform legislation tend to have 
a greater proportion of their requests satisfied in the bill; (2) con-
tributing lobbyists are more likely than other lobbyists to persuade 
senators to introduce their preferences as amendments to the bill; 
and (3) contributions are better predictors of senators’ willingness 
to introduce group-requested amendments than contributions are 
in explaining groups’ level of success more generally. these results 
go significantly further than previous research to explicitly link lob-
byists’ influence attempts to corresponding actions by legislators.
Theory
the ability of interest groups to influence legislation is 
not absolute, if  it occurs at all. Lowery (2013) offers a dozen 
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explanations for why researchers so seldom find evidence of the 
influence of interest groups and their money on policy decisions, 
including the possibility that groups actually have little influence 
over politicians. yet even in that case, Lowery identifies a fac-
tor on which influence is conditioned: issue salience (2013, 17). 
alternatively conceived of as the visibility or ideological content 
of a proposal, issue salience has often been studied as an impor-
tant variable in explaining policy outcomes and interest groups’ 
roles in them. some scholars focus on decision-making processes 
in which public visibility is expected to be low, such as in the bu-
reaucracy (drope and Hansen 2004; Haeder and yackee 2015) or 
behind closed committee doors (evans 1996; schroedel 1986). a 
small body of research directly tests the effects of issue salience on 
interest groups’ ability to influence policymaking (Fellowes and 
Wolf 2004; Jones and Keiser 1987; Neustadtl 1990; Witko 2006). 
the present study’s contribution is to specify several conditions—
including public visibility—under which influence is more likely to 
occur and to test these hypotheses using particularly fine-grained 
data. the exclusive rather than broad nature of the legislative ben-
efits, and the ease with which they can be given, are also important 
predictors of a tighter relationship between political money and 
policy outcomes. i theorize more specifically that interest groups 
that financially support legislators are more likely to be successful 
in legislation when (1) the lobbyist seeks a private policy good, 
(2) from a single legislator, (3) without attracting public atten-
tion. these three factors are discussed next.
Private Benefit
a private benefit is one that is narrowly tailored to highly 
specific interests. the microlegislation found in one-page or even 
one-sentence amendments offered by committee members writing 
the affordable Care act is replete with rent seeking and other pri-
vate benefits. For example: “include geriatricians in the definition 
of primary care providers for the purposes of the primary care 
bonus”; “reinstate reimbursement for dual energy x-ray absorp-
tiometry (dXa) and vertebral fracture assessment (vFa)”; “in-
crease the Medicare payment rate for nurse-midwives for covered 
services from 65% of the rate that would be paid were a physi-
cian performing a service to the full rate”; “adjust the Puerto rico 
Medicare inpatient hospital rate to 100% of the national payment 
rate.” these rewards are clearly directed at narrow populations.
4 amy Melissa McKay
We know empirically that lobby groups place great value 
on private benefits (alexander, Mazza, and scholz 2009; drope 
and Hansen 2004; richter, samphantharak, and timmons 2009). 
godwin, ainsworth, and godwin, in their sample of Fortune 1000 
firms, found, for example, that when a proposed policy afforded 
private benefits to a firm, the firm was eight times as likely to 
lobby for it as when the policy afforded a policy good that ben-
efited many firms. Moreover, when the potential profit was greater, 
so was the likelihood that the firm would lobby (2012, 356). thus, 
lobbyists pursue most vigorously those policy goods that supply a 
clear benefit to the lobbying group. since more intense lobbying is 
likely to involve making campaign contributions (ansolabehere, 
snyder, and tripathi 2002), the literature supports the theory that 
campaign contributions from lobby groups flow to legislators will-
ing to deliver private policy benefits to current or potential donors.
Single Legislator
in offering an amendment, senators are able to take positions 
(Mayhew 1974) without having to negotiate. every senator on the 
Finance Committee can offer multiple amendments to a bill, and 
an interest group that wants a particular amendment must con-
vince only one committee member to introduce it. the introduc-
tion of amendments at this stage is not subject to the approval of 
the chair or whole committee. By contrast, getting an amendment 
into the final committee report requires the assent of the chair or 
a majority of the committee, and advocates must pass countless 
veto points before securing a preference in an adopted law. the 
unilateral nature of amendment offering provides a rare chance to 
observe individual legislators delivering private policy goods. even 
if  the amendment is not later adopted into the bill, for an individ-
ual lobbyist, having written proof that he or she made progress in 
committee can be valuable in retaining clients. Other studies have 
found amendments to be among the benefits legislators can deliver 
to interest groups (evans 1996; Hall and Wayman 1990).
Low Visibility
Politicians face competing incentives to do things that encour-
age lobbyists to contribute to them while avoiding doing things 
that might raise ethical questions. influence is therefore more 
likely to be observed when visibility is lower. Fellowes and Wolf, 
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for example, found evidence that business interests influenced con-
gressional votes—but only for technical regulatory or tax legisla-
tion, and not for appropriations. they argue that this distinction is 
evidence of legislators’ desire to be helpful to contributors without 
risking “an embarrassing quid pro quo” (2004, 315).
the literature provides numerous examples of microlegisla-
tion that allows legislators to provide private policy benefits out-
side of public view. distributive earmarks appear in committee 
reports without ever having been voted on (Lazarus 2010; Lazarus 
and steigerwalt 2009). directives to agencies from Congress ac-
company legislation instead of being written into law (evans 
2004). tax breaks for specific firms are obscured in details about 
the year and location in which the firm was chartered (Bartlett 
and steele 1988, cited in richter, samphantharak, and timmons 
2009). the common theme is that legislative favors to special in-
terests are intentionally hidden in low-visibility microlegislation.
amendments offered in committee are prime examples of 
the microlegislation that lobby groups seek. as Hall and Wayman 
note, the “less public, often informal nature of committee deci-
sion-making suggests that members’ responsiveness to campaign 
donors will receive less scrutiny” (1990, 801). Within a committee, 
visibility is lower for amendments than it is during the initial draft-
ing stage or the final report stage of consideration of a bill. during 
the Finance Committee’s consideration of health reform legisla-
tion in 2009, only 20% of the introduced amendments were dis-
cussed in markup, and just 14% received a roll-call vote.1  yet some 
of these undiscussed amendments nonetheless appear in the com-
mittee report and, ultimately, in the adopted law, indicating that 
senators pushed them through without attracting public attention. 
in short, the low-visibility, private benefits that a single legislator 
can bestow on a lobby group creates the conditions under which 
we should see a statistically significant positive relationship be-
tween campaign contributions and greater legislative success.
The Case
Committee consideration in Congress is at least among the 
most important opportunities for lobbyists to influence the content 
of bills (Berry and Wilcox 2018; evans 1996; Hall and Wayman 
1990; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998; Wright 1990). in their landmark 
1990 article, Hall and Wayman argue that scholars looking for inter-
est group influence should examine what goes on in congressional 
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committees. By focusing on the energy members put into legisla-
tion in committee—efforts such as attending committee hearings 
and meetings, speaking at those meetings, offering amendments, 
and working behind the scenes—the authors find a positive and sig-
nificant relationship between members’ legislative effort in commit-
tee and the PaC contributions they receive from groups interested 
in the legislation. the present study builds on Hall and Wayman’s 
seminal research by testing similar questions but with micro-level 
data not available to Hall and Wayman (1990). in particular, i link 
the groups’ highly specific individual requests to the collective and 
personal contributions lobbyists make to committee members. the 
conclusions of this article are quite similar to  those of  Hall and 
Wayman’s (1990) .
as one of the most significant pieces of legislation in decades, 
the affordable Care act has been the single focus of several empir-
ical studies in political science (e.g., dinan 2011; Joondeph 2011; 
skocpol and Jacobs 2010), though none of these have focused on 
the lobbying surrounding the legislation. given that numerous 
scholars have argued that the influence of money is more likely 
to be seen when issue salience is lower (Fellowes and Wolf 2004; 
godwin, ainsworth, and godwin 2012; Witko 2006), the high sali-
ence surrounding health reform legislation provides a strong test 
of the theory that interest group money affects policy outcomes.
Transparency and Counterfactuals
While no study of the effects of money on policymaking can 
prove a causal link, the design used here allows for significant in-
ferences to be made in several ways: by identifying very similar 
language in lobbyists’ written preferences and the amendments 
offered by senators in committee, by testing hypotheses at three 
different units of analysis, by including a wide variety of control 
variables, and by employing a number of robustness checks.
The Data
three decisions coincided that led to unusual transparency 
in consideration of the us health reform bill in 2009. First, the 
senate Finance Committee, deluged by lobbyists requesting meet-
ings with committee staff, created an email address so that groups 
could send in written comments on the proposals promulgated by 
the committee. these comments were retained by the committee 
7Buying amendments?
and provided to me; they were not made public. this is impor-
tant because researchers seldom have access to detailed data about 
what groups want (Lowery 2013), and as a result, us interest 
group scholars have rarely analyzed the content of lobby groups’ 
arguments to legislators (Burstein 2014, Chap. 6).
in a second act of transparency, the committee published 
online all of the 564 amendments proposed by committee mem-
bers, which it had never done before.2  the staff  and senators who 
wrote these amendments, then, were in the habit of writing for an 
audience of other committee members and staff—and they may 
not have considered that the amendments would become publicly 
available.
third, the Honest Leadership and Open government act of 
2007 required registered lobbyists to submit for the first time the 
details of all federal contributions from their personal accounts, as 
well as contributions from any PaCs the lobbyist controlled. the 
first report was due in the summer of 2008. the newness of this re-
quirement may have kept lobbyists from realizing how closely their 
contributions could be linked to their lobbying activities. indeed, 
compliance with the law increased markedly between 2008–09 and 
2009–10.3  and because the data must be downloaded, collated, 
cleaned, and string-matched to other data to find relationships, 
this article is among the few that have used it (exceptions being 
Koger and victor 2009; McKay 2018).
Stages of Legislative Development
the method of comparing policy drafts before and after in-
terest group lobbying has been advocated as an ideal way to de-
tect groups’ influence (Lowery 2013). While numerous studies 
of governments’ open consultations with the public have been 
conducted in the european union (e.g., Klüver 2011; Quittkat 
2011; rasmussen and alexandrova 2012; rasmussen and Carroll 
2014) as well as in us federal agencies (golden 1998; yackee and 
yackee 2006), written comments to congressional committees have 
never before been analyzed in political science publications (but 
see Burstein’s 2014 analysis of witness testimony in congressional 
committees). yet doing so is likely to yield significantly different 
conclusions about the ability of lobbyists to secure their policy 
preferences: “it’s too hard to try to locate the precise policy con-
cessions that each interest group is looking for; these can be quite 
specific and won’t necessarily show up in aggregate measures of 
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policy” (Fouirnaies and Hall 2017). i use the multiple stages of 
bill development to test the hypothesis that campaign contribu-
tions are more likely to matter under conditions of low visibility in 
which private benefits are provided unilaterally (relative to condi-
tions of higher visibility, more diffuse benefits, and multilateral 
agreement).
in late april 2009, before committee consideration of the bill 
began, senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus pub-
lishes the first of three sets of proposals called the Options for 
Health reform, written by him and his specialist staff. in september 
(stage 1), Baucus releases his first draft Chairman’s Mark based 
on the Options and feedback from lobby groups and others. eight 
days later (stage 2), committee markup begins, and committee 
members submit written amendments to the draft with the en-
couragement of particular interest groups. at this stage, the three 
conditions of our theory are met: visibility is low, since the full set 
of amendments is never discussed on the record; specific groups 
benefit, as amendments are narrowly tailored and do not regard 
the major tenets of the bill; and the threshold for success is lowest, 
since any senator can offer an unlimited number of amendments 
without the approval of any other committee member of even the 
chair. a fraction of the introduced amendments is discussed dur-
ing markup; other amendments appear in the Chairman’s Mark 
draft without being discussed. in October, a majority of the com-
mittee approves the amended legislation (all committee democrats 
plus one republican) (stage 3). the Chairman’s Modified and 
amended Mark is what i call the report, which technically is con-
ceptual language that is sent to the Legislative Counsel office to 
put into legislative language. (the Finance Committee does not 
require that members vote on the legislative language, only the 
conceptual language.) the bill that would become the affordable 
Care act then goes on to the full senate, where in december it is 
passed by a 60-vote, filibuster-proof majority.4 
table 1 summarizes the three conditions: visibility, the scope 
of benefits, and the number of veto players, along with my expec-
tations about the effects of these on the extent to which contribu-
tions may matter at different stages of legislative development.
Levels of Analysis and Variables
to create a detailed picture of lobbying on the bill in the com-
mittee that authored it, the analysis proceeds at three levels—the 
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lobby group, the group-senator dyad, and the side of a legislative 
proposal.
Level 1: The Group as the Unit of Analysis
analysis of success at the level of the group allows us to test 
the hypothesis that variation in the hypothesized conditions of vis-
ibility, scope of benefit, and agreement threshold across stages of 
legislative development help explain variation in whether a group’s 
campaign contributions influence its success. the definition of 
success, our dependent variable, varies across stages. in stage 1, 
success in the mark describes the proportion of a group’s “asks” 
that appear in the chairman’s mark document. in parallel fash-
ion, in stage 3, success in the report indicates the proportion of a 
group’s requests that appear in the committee’s final version of the 
bill.
to estimate groups’ success in the Mark and in the report, 
i used the Options books to create a codebook spreadsheet with 
proposals as the variables and letter submitters as the observa-
tions. First, my research associates and i coded the outcome of 
each proposal (i.e., whether it was adopted in the Mark and in 
the report). doing so was straightforward, since the Chairman’s 
Mark comprised the same structure as the Options and used 
largely identical text, and since after Markup, committee staff  cir-
culated an amended and Modified Chairman’s Mark that used 
“tracked changes” to highlight the differences between it and the 
original Mark.
We then read through the letters and coded each men-
tioned request as 1 (if  the group supported the option) or −1 (for 
taBLe 1  
the Presence of the Hypothesized Conditions across stages of 
Legislative development
Conditions
stages of Legislative development
stage 1: the Mark stage 2: amendments stage 3: the report
visibility Medium Low High
scope of Benefit Broader Private Broader
veto Players Chairman individual senator Majority of 
committee
Expectation Contributions 
matter least
Contributions matter 
most
Contributions mat-
ter somewhat
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opposition). We also created new variables for requests that were 
made by multiple groups that did not appear in the Options. since 
groups’ letters typically use bullet points or concise paragraphs to 
present the Options they wish to comment about, alongside their 
preferred outcome for each, it was a simple matter to code whether 
the group approved or disapproved of each proposal mentioned. 
after coding the letters, i changed outcome codes from 0 to −1 
(leaving 1s alone), so that when multiplied by each group’s request 
(1 or −1), a success indicator was generated that was either 1 if  
the group’s preference was adopted or 0 if  the group’s preference 
was not adopted. each group then had a series of 1s or 0s indicat-
ing whether it realized its preferred outcomes for each provision 
it mentioned in its letter in both the Mark and in the report. the 
number of successes was then divided by the number of requests 
made in each letter to yield two proportions: success in the mark 
and success in the report.
in stage 2, the group is successful if  any of its requests are 
found in a microlegislative amendment offered by any commit-
tee member to the chairman’s mark. i generated success in getting 
an amendment offered using, at first, a broad approach because 
of the likelihood that senators and congressional staff  intention-
ally deviate from the language of groups’ requests as they wrote 
amendments.
in eight cases, a senator (Jeff  Bingaman, d-NM) explicitly 
listed specific groups as having endorsed the amendment. For all 
other amendments, i employed plagiarism software to find in-
stances of sequential words that appear in both sets of documents, 
as others have done (Kroeger 2015; Wilkerson, smith, and stramp 
2015). specifically, i used wCopyfind, varying its parameters (num-
ber of imperfections, length of matches) in an inductive way until 
i had identified all possible matches between the 564 amendments 
(as a corpus) and each group letter. each of these was checked to 
discard the many nonsubstantive matches (e.g., “department of 
Health and Human services” or language that appeared verbatim 
in the Options).
as a secondary route to amendment matching, i chose key 
phrases from each amendment that distinguish it from similar pro-
posals based on my understanding of the content of the legislation 
(these phrases are available on request). i then used the easyFind 
search application to search the comments for the key phrases, and 
i checked all of these to distinguish substantive matches from co-
incidental language.
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turning next to the generated list of all possible matches, 
i identified in each letter the language that was most similar to 
the language of the amendment, reading the entire letter to make 
sure that the language that was pulled from it is representative of 
what the group wants. When multiple groups proposed language 
reflected in a single amendment, it suggested that either the groups 
were working together (as with a trade association) or that the 
request appeared in the Options. so i identified in the Options 
language that closely matched the request, if  any. i counted an 
amendment as matching the group’s request only if  the group af-
firmatively made a request that was not already in the Options 
because only these are requests for private benefits (i.e., the group, 
not the committee staff, originated the provision). i then reviewed 
the three columns of (1) interest group language, (2) amend-
ment language, and (3) Options language (if  any) and evaluated 
whether the amendment and letter were a definite or probable 
match. Matches were only definite if  i determined that the group’s 
requests and the amendment were almost certainly describing the 
same proposal. table 2 offers some examples of the definite and 
probable matches produced by this procedure.
using this process, i identified 159 possible matches and 131 
definite matches between an amendment and a group. since many 
amendments were proposed by multiple senator-sponsors, and 
keeping only the definite matches, the number of senator-group 
dyads in which there was an amendment was 186. importantly, 
identifying matches of group requests and offered amendments 
was blind to interest groups’ campaign contributions.
Following Papke and Wooldridge (1996; also see Baum 
2008), i used a generalized linear model to model the propor-
tion of groups’ success in the mark and success in the report. this 
method makes a logit transformation of the dependent variable 
and then applies a binomial distribution, since the variance of a 
binomial distribution approaches 0 as the mean approaches either 
0 or 1. the dichotomous success in getting an amendment offered 
is estimated using logistical regression. in all three models, fixed 
effects are used for senators in lieu of controlling for variation 
between senators. each organization that submits comments and 
each organization listed on the letterhead of a coalition is included 
in the sample, for a total of 866 organizations. Models control for 
correlation within coalitions by using errors clustered on the coali-
tion. (if  groups belonged to more than one coalition, errors were 
clustered on the highest-revenue coalition to which it belonged.)
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Level 2: The Group-Senator Dyad as the Unit of Analysis
the amendment stage is the only point during committee 
consideration in which individual senators are directly linked to 
their specific policy preferences. therefore, in the second level of 
analysis, all groups that submit requests are paired with every sen-
ator on the committee, making the unit of analysis 19,052 lobby 
group-senator dyads. evaluating dyads avoids selecting on the de-
pendent variable by including every possible instance of contribu-
tions made and amendments offered to see if  these are significantly 
linked. the hypothesis tested is that lobby group-senator dyads 
that contain a contribution are more likely than other dyads to 
also contain an amendment. the dependent variable, dyad amend-
ment, indicates whether or not the senator in the dyad offered an 
amendment that reflects a request made by the lobby group in the 
dyad.
Level 3: The Side as the Unit of Analysis
in a final level of analysis, i acknowledge that advocacy ef-
forts on opposite sides of a policy proposal (i.e., for and against) 
tend to cancel out, as groups on both sides of a proposal make 
contributions and control resources (Baumgartner et al. 2009). 
to distinguish sides with more money from sides with more or 
stronger advocates, the data are reshaped so that the unit of anal-
ysis is the 259 legislative proposals commented upon by interest 
groups (75% of which appear in the Options). Lobbying expen-
ditures and revenue are not included in the side-level analysis be-
cause the advantage in lobbying expenditures is correlated with 
contributions advantage at 0.84, and the advantage in revenue is 
correlated with numeric advantage at 0.80. i test the hypothesis 
that the side that contributes more is more likely to win, using two 
dependent variables: whether the proposal appears in the mark and 
whether the proposal appears in the report. amendments are not a 
part of the side-level analysis because unless a group was involved 
in proposing an amendment, it would likely have no knowledge of 
what was contained in them before they were offered.
Key Explanatory Variable
the key explanatory variables in all three levels of analysis 
are the campaign contributions made from groups that submitted 
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comments to senators on the Finance Committee in 2009 or 2010. 
these contributions may be from the group’s PaC or, for the first 
time, they may be from any of its in-house or contract lobbyists. 
Federal campaign contributions in 2010 were limited to $2,400 for 
individuals, and $5,000 for PaCs, per candidate election. in the 
models, i aggregated contributions from in-house lobbyists, firm 
lobbyists, and PaCs into a single dichotomous variable. in supple-
mentary analysis (shown later in Figure 2), i treat them separately.
at the group level, campaign contributions  =  1 if  any con-
tributions are made to any committee member in 2008–10 from 
the group’s PaC, in-house lobbyists, or hired contract lobbyists; 
otherwise, contributions = 0. at the dyad level, contributions = 1 
only if  the group in the dyad contributes to the senator in the dyad 
(via the PaC or any lobbyists for the group). Models using dol-
lar amounts instead of a dichotomous variable are illustrated in 
Figure 2.
the data to be matched come from several sources. data from 
the senate Office of Public records describe lobbyists’ disclosures 
as required by the Lobbying disclosure act and lobbyists’ con-
tributions as required by the 2008 law, and data from the Federal 
elections Commission describe PaCs’ contributions.5  at the sides 
level, the key explanatory variable is the net contributions dollars 
from the proponents of the provision as a proportion of the total 
contribution dollars from proponents and opponents. in calculat-
ing contributions advantage, i made sure not to double-count con-
tributions from a single lobbyist on behalf  of multiple clients on 
the same side of an issue.
Control Variables
to control for the possibility that effective lobbying, rather 
than campaign contributions, is actually influencing senators, i in-
clude in the models the group’s reported lobbying expenditures in 
2009 and 2010. these are the dollar amounts reported by lobby 
groups every quarter for a given client. Lobbying expenditures 
have been used in previous studies to help separate the effects of 
campaign contributions from the effects of lobbying activity alone 
(Hojnacki and Kimball 1998; Wright 1990). these data come from 
the senate Office of Public records, but i use the cleaned versions 
provided by the Center for responsive Politics.6 
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in addition, revenue is an important variable, since we know 
senator Baucus sought to please large organizations in an effort 
to avoid losing, the way democrats had lost on health reform in 
the 1990s (Mcdonough 2011). this control variable comes from 
federal sources, including the irs form 990 for tax-exempt organi-
zations, the securities and exchange Commission’s 10-K and 8-K 
forms, and, failing those sources, the group’s own website. Revenue 
is logged because the raw numbers are unwieldy but still produce 
the same significance for the key explanatory variable. due to 
missing data, revenue is imputed in 4.6% of cases based on a re-
gression of revenue on lobbying expenditures, PaC contributions, 
lobbyists’ contributions, and whether the organization represents 
business. (dropping the observations with missing revenue data 
does not change the results.) the total number of requests made 
is controlled for so that we may evaluate whether there are dimin-
ishing—or increasing—marginal returns to scale on lobbyists’ re-
quests. (if  we exclude from the model the number of requests in the 
letter, the results show stronger effects for the influence of money 
in all four models in the group-level and dyadic analyses.) a final 
control variable indicates whether the interest group’s headquarters 
were in any committee member’s state or, in the dyadic analysis, 
the specific senator’s state. this variable stands as a proxy for con-
stituent effects, since we know that legislators favor their own con-
stituents in policymaking (arnold 1990; Fenno 1978).
the data suggest some senator-specific effects, including, for 
example, that minority-party members offered more amendments 
than majority-party members. But since there are only 23 sena-
tors on the committee, i instead use fixed effects for each senator 
so that we are observing variation within senators across groups. 
using senator fixed effects necessarily drops one observation, a 
senator whose amendments could not be linked to any particular 
interest group. since the chair does not make amendments and has 
ultimate control over the content of the legislation, he is also left 
out of the dyadic analysis. descriptive statistics for all variables 
appear in table 3.
Results
When an interest group or its registered lobbyists contributed 
to a senator who was drafting health reform legislation in 2009, the 
group was significantly more likely to be successful in all three stages 
of legislative development. Contributions activity was most strongly 
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associated with interest group success during the amendment stage. 
in fact, in many cases the language in the amendment is the same as 
language in the group’s written comment—which, given the dem-
onstrated difficulty of identifying the influence of interest groups in 
lawmaking (Lowery 2013), represents something of a smoking gun.
For example, one letter from a vaccine manufacturer “strongly 
supports the Committee’s emphasis on prevention services, on a 
first dollar basis” and requests that the bill “include a specific ref-
erence to ‘recommended vaccines … and immunizations recom-
mended by the advisory Committee on immunization Practices 
(aCiP)” (Lobby groups 2009). an amendment to provide “first 
dollar coverage for prevention-related … immunizations recom-
mended by the advisory Committee on immunization Practices 
(aCiP).” (us Committee on Finance 2009) was offered by a sena-
tor who represented the company’s state and who received a $2,000 
contribution from the PaC of the company that wrote the letter.
another letter is from a nonprofit group that says it “has 
a long history of promoting improvements in healthcare quality 
and safety, and has been instrumental in raising the bar of qual-
ity standards … since its inception in [year more than five years 
ago].” it requests that the bill create a “center or institute” that 
“be a not for profit entity in the private sector; have demonstrated 
competencies in understanding the factors that contribute to suc-
cessful quality improvement and patient safety initiatives; pos-
sess the resident knowledge and expertise to fulfill the above five 
objectives; have a demonstrated track record of broadly engag-
ing relevant stakeholder groups; and have the capacity to lever-
age quality improvement and patient safety change across the care 
continuum” (Lobby groups 2009). an amendment put forth by a 
senator describes “a non-profit organization or organizations that 
have at least five years of experience in developing and implement-
ing the [five] new strategies; have operated such programs … to 
improve patient safety and the quality of health care … working 
with a variety of institutional health care providers, physicians and 
other health care practitioners” (us Committee on Finance 2009). 
the group requested $35 million be allocated to this center; the 
amendment contains “a mandatory appropriation of $25 million 
per year for Fy10, Fy11, and Fy12” (us Committee on Finance 
2009). Lobbyists representing the group gave a total of $5,000 to 
the senator in 2009.
a third letter requests that “healthcare-associated 
infection[s][, as measured by the] prevention metrics and targets 
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[, as] established in the department of  Health and Human 
services’ HHs action Plan to Prevent Healthcare-associated 
infections or any successor plan” be included in the bill’s pro-
posed Medicare value-based purchasing. such a change would 
create a significant incentive for hospitals to test Medicare pa-
tients for hospital-acquired infections before discharge. it was re-
quested (Lobby groups 2009) by the company that made possible 
the first two-hour test of  multiple patient specimens for multiple 
infections simultaneously (previous tests required several days). 
virtually identical language (except as indicated by the brackets) 
appears in an amendment (us Committee on Finance 2009) by a 
senator representing the state in which the company is located—
a senator who received the maximum allowed contribution from 
the firm’s PaC.
the striking similarity of language between these three letters 
and the corresponding amendments suggests that the authors of 
each read, or at least communicated about, each other’s language. 
the contributions from the group to the senator only buttress the 
apparent connection. and these group-requested amendments are 
not merely senators’ empty gestures to appease groups: group-re-
quested amendments are more than twice as likely to be accepted 
into the bill relative to other amendments. We can conclude that 
senators treat seriously the group-requested amendments and work 
behind the scenes to secure their place in the bill.
Analysis at Level 1 (the Group): Predicting Group Success at 
Different Stages of Legislation
Lobbyists’ personal and PaC contributions are significantly 
related to lobbyists’ probability of success at all three stages of 
legislative development, and the effect is strongest during the 
middle stage, as expected. the first model in table 4 shows that 
contributions from the group’s lobbyists or PaC are significantly 
and positively associated with greater success in the mark. When 
a group or any of its registered lobbyists contribute to a member 
of the committee, the proportion of the group’s requests found 
in the chairman’s mark almost doubles, from 22% to 41%. the 
third model shows a significant association between contributions 
from a group or its registered lobbyists and the proportion of the 
group’s requests that are found in the report: when a group’s lob-
byists make any contributions to any Finance Committee member, 
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the predicted probability of success in the report moves from about 
26% to about 43%—an increase of 74% over the lower number.
in the middle stage of committee consideration, the low-
salience, low-hurdle, private-benefit amendments sought by lobby 
groups are even more strongly associated with contributions rel-
ative to stages 1 and 3. the predicted probability of success in 
getting an amendment offered is more than four times larger for 
groups that contribute, relative to groups that lobby the same legis-
lators on the same issue but do not contribute. the predicted prob-
ability of securing an amendment moves from 5% to 22% when 
the group contributes to any member of the committee. the mag-
nitude of this relationship between lobbyists’ contributions and 
success in getting an amendment offered is considerably stronger 
than the relationship between lobbyists’ contributions and either 
success in the mark or success in the report.7 
regarding the control variables, the models show that hav-
ing greater revenue has a positive but modest effect on a group’s 
success in the mark. Predictive margins indicate that groups 
with logged revenue amounts at the 75th percentile typically 
see an increase of  about 1%–3% of  their requests realized in 
the mark relative to those at the 25th percentile. as expected 
given Chairman Baucus’s intention to appeal in the beginning 
to larger interest groups (Mcdonough 2011), a group’s rev-
enue has the strongest effect on success during the mark stage. 
Lobbying expenditures in millions of  dollars have no clear ef-
fect on the group’s success when controlling for contributions. 
(in alternative analyses, logged lobbying expenditures are posi-
tive and significant, however, and contributions are still positive 
and significant.) a greater number of  requests is associated with 
greater group success in all of  the models, especially in the mark 
and the report. and whether the lobby group was located in any 
Finance Committee member’s state is not a positive and signifi-
cant predictor of  success in any of  the models when controlling 
for whether the group contributes.
Analysis at Level 2 (the Dyad): Modeling a Group’s Success in 
Getting a Particular Senator to Offer a Request as an Amendment
in the dyadic analysis, shown in table 5 and illustrated in 
Figure 1, the predicted probability that a senator offers an amend-
ment that is very similar to a request made by the group is about 
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five times greater if  the group contributes to the senator: the pre-
dicted probability of securing an amendment increases from 0.7% 
to 3.5% when the group or any of its lobbyists donates to the sena-
tor. the use of fixed effects for senators means that the same sena-
tors are more likely to offer amendments requested by groups that 
contribute to them relative to groups that do not. the significance 
of the relationship between contributions and amendments holds 
while controlling for a group’s wealth or size (as captured by its an-
nual revenue), constituent effects (as proxied by whether the group 
was headquartered in the senator’s state), and lobbying activities 
(its lobbying expenditures and the number of requests the group 
made).
Figure 2 shows that the type of donor—contract (firm) lob-
byist, in-house lobbyist, or PaC, as well as the amount donated—
are associated with differential success in getting an amendment 
offered. the effect of the amount of money on the predicted prob-
ability of securing an amendment is positive for all three donor 
sources, and it is significant for PaCs. the slope is sharpest for 
in-house lobbyists, who provide the least money but most directly 
lobby senators. Firm lobbyists contribute the most, but because 
they represent numerous clients, members may not link firm lob-
byists’ contributions with the preferences of particular groups. 
Figure 1  
Predicted Probability that the senator Offers an amendment 
requested by the group 
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PaCs supply more money than in-house lobbyists but less than 
firm lobbyists, and their effect size is between those of the other 
two kinds of donors.
Analysis at Level 3 (the Side): Modeling Side Success as a 
Function of Advantages
at the third and final level of analysis, the models suggest 
that even while controlling for the preference of the majority of 
lobby groups, there may still be an advantage to the side that con-
tributes more. as shown in table 6, both contributions advantage 
and numeric advantage are positively associated with the probabil-
ity that the provision appears in the mark and in the report. as the 
contributions are changed from all on the “anti” side to all on the 
“pro” side, the predicted probability that the proposal is adopted 
moves from 36% to 54% for the mark and 34% to 61% for the 
report.
Most of the time (82%), the side that has more lobbyists is 
also the side that makes more contributions. in the 46 cases the 
majority of lobbyists do not provide the majority of contributions, 
the majority side wins 78% of the time and the money-advantaged 
Figure 2  
relationship Between groups’ Campaign Contributions 
to a senator and the Predicted Probability that the senator 
sponsors an amendment requested by the group, by source of 
Contribution 
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side wins 22% of the time. Figure 3 illustrates that as the differen-
tial between the number of advocates or contributions grows in 
favor of the “pro” side, so too does the probability that the pro-
posal is adopted. and when the majority oppose a proposal (on 
the left), money is more helpful than when the majority approve 
of it.
taBLe 6  
Predicting success for specific Proposals Within the Health 
reform Legislation
  in the Mark in the report
Contributions advantage of Proposal supporters 
(supporters' contributions minus opponents' 
contributions)
.402 (.125) .451 (.138)
Numeric advantage of Proposal supporters (num-
ber of supporters minus number of opponents)
18.361 
(8.425)
19.103 (8.566)
Constant .377 (.080) .455 (.093)
Observations 261 261
McFadden Pseudo-r2 .208 .234
Note: the table depicts logit models predicting whether individual legislative proposals ap-
pear in the mark and in the report during senate Finance Committee consideration of 
health reform legislation in 2009. Cells contain logit coefficients with errors below in paren-
theses. significant coefficients (at p < .05) are indicated in bold.
Figure 3  
Comparing Numeric to Contributions advantages in Predicting 
Legislative Proposal success
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Discussion and Conclusions
Following previous examples set by Hall and Wayman 
(1990), evans (1996), denzau and Munger (1986), Baumgartner 
et al. (2009), and Hall and deardorff  (2006), this article seeks to 
understand the conditions under which interest group lobbyists’ 
campaign contributions are associated with the decisions of us 
Members of Congress to advance microlegislation preferred by 
donors. the study builds on previous work by providing evidence 
that contribution-legislation relationships are especially likely to 
be seen in amendment offering, a phenomenon that is a perfect 
storm of low visibility, unilateral action, and private benefits.
the group-level analysis suggests that the predicted prob-
ability that a group is successful in getting requested microlegisla-
tion introduced in a senator’s amendment is more than four times 
greater for groups that contribute to committee members relative 
to groups that lobby the same legislators on the same issue at the 
same time but do not contribute. this relationship between lobby-
ists’ contributions and legislative success is stronger in getting low-
visibility, unilateral, microlegislative amendments offered than it is 
in either the earlier mark stage or the later report stage, though it 
is present in all three stages. a group that contributes increases its 
predicted probability of success from 22% to 41% in the mark and 
from 26% to 44% in the report.
Further, the dyadic analysis suggests that when a group—or 
any of the lobbyists employed by or representing the group as a cli-
ent—contribute to a committee member, the odds that the specific 
senator offers an amendment desired by the specific group are five 
times larger than if  no contribution occurs in the dyad. the greater 
estimated magnitude of the relationship between contributions 
and amendment offering in the dyadic analysis as compared to the 
group-level analysis is evidence that individual lobbyists’ contribu-
tions may have an interpersonal effect on senators’ willingness to 
provide the lobby group with microlegislation. this is a less benign 
interpretation than the conclusion from the group-level analysis 
that groups that donate to senators are generally more legislatively 
successful.
the third level of analysis—the side of a proposal—shows 
that the side that gives more contributions is more likely to win, 
even after controlling for whether or not it is the majority side. 
When the majority gives less money than the minority, the money-
advantaged side wins in 22% of the cases.
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in the case of health reform legislation in 2009, staff  mem-
bers not used to having amendments published online, lobbyists 
unaccustomed to reporting to the House and senate their personal 
contributions, and senators who may not have anticipated that 
lobbyists’ requests would become public might have been more 
off-guard than they would ordinarily be. the confluence of these 
circumstances leads to the observation of a connection that is sel-
dom made in the literature.
there are two reasons in particular to be confident in the ex-
ternal validity of this study. First, the results are closely consistent 
with other quantitative studies of similar phenomena (evans 1996, 
2004; Fellowes and Wolf 2004; Hall and Wayman 1990; Lazarus 
2010), all of which show that lobbyists’ ability to influence legisla-
tors is more likely when the risk is low that outsiders will notice. 
second, the high salience of health reform legislation incentivized 
groups and senators to be especially cautious to avoid drawing at-
tention to the microlegislation they were jointly developing. under 
conditions of lower public scrutiny, senators would naturally be 
equally or more likely to exchange legislative favors for contribu-
tions, not less likely.
the incidence of group-requested amendments in these data 
is necessarily low, and this is consistent with the theory. senators 
and their staff  typically adjust the microlegislation suggested by 
lobbyists to be consistent with competing demands. For example, 
legislators may try to merge multiple groups’ requests into one so-
lution; they may present a variation on the request that does not 
go as far as the requester wants; they may use an amendment to 
reiterate the content of a bill they have sponsored; or they may 
alter a request to conform with the committee’s strict “offset” re-
quirement that all spending legislation be paid for. in fact, if  we 
relax the assumptions and count the probable matches described 
above as definite matches, the relationship between contributions 
and amendment offering is even stronger. this suggests that sen-
ators and their staffs do not just copy and paste group requests 
into amendments. taking ownership of a piece of microlegislation 
gives senators talking points they can use to help secure reelec-
tion, while also obscuring the connection between legislator and 
lobbyist.
importantly, i stop short of arguing that the contributions 
caused legislators to offer requested amendments, as this study 
is not a randomized field experiment (such as that of Kalla and 
Broockman 2016), and given that, the timing of contributions is 
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not important: whether a contribution from a group to a sena-
tor in the 2010 cycle is made before, during, or after the Finance 
Committee’s september 2009 markup (as are 32%, 7%, and 61%, 
respectively) is not correlated with whether the senator offers an 
amendment requested by the group. a contribution that comes 
after an amendment is offered may be a thank you, or the amend-
ment may have been offered in expectation (or in hope) of a later 
payment. in any case, the 186 dyads that include 131 instances of 
specific language found in an interest group letter that corresponds 
to language in a committee member’s amendment, combined with 
the significantly greater likelihood that the group that requested 
the amendment makes a contribution to the senator that intro-
duces it, imply that under certain conditions, contributions and 
microlegislation are related.
By including in the models a variable designating whether the 
group’s headquarters are in the senator’s state, i show that contri-
butions matter to group success beyond home-state connections. 
and the provision-level analysis shows that the side that contrib-
utes more tends to win, even controlling for the number of lobby 
groups on each side. Moreover, the study finds evidence that con-
tributions correlate with members’ decisions to take a legislative 
action desired by the contributing group—which is a step beyond 
members’ granting greater access to campaign contributors, as 
found recently (Kalla and Broockman 2016).
this study provides several reasons to question the assump-
tion that low contribution limits obviate their effects. First, con-
tributing is not the norm: almost two-thirds of groups that we 
know lobbied Finance Committee members about health reform 
made no identifiable contribution to anyone on the committee 
in the 2010 electoral cycle, and only 12% of lobby group-senator 
dyads contain a PaC or lobbyist contribution. From the senator’s 
point of view, then, contributors are special. second, and relatedly, 
legislators likely pay more attention to the fact that a group con-
tributes than to how much it contributes, which is consistent with 
research suggesting that even small contributions can have impor-
tant effects on legislators’ behavior (Langbein 1986; stratmann 
1991). third, while individual and PaC contribution amounts are 
limited, a group’s contributions can add up. summing the contri-
butions of each group’s PaC and firm and in-house lobbyists, the 
average amount that a donating group in these data gives to a sen-
ator’s campaign is about $5,828. since in the 2010 electoral cycle, 
the average Finance Committee member received about $922,000 
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in contributions from PaCs and individuals in the health sector, it 
would take only about 158 of these contributing groups to reach 
the health sector total—and we know that at least 866 groups lob-
bied the committee on the bill.8 
the research suggests future lines of inquiry about the effects 
of money on microlegislation. For example, a history of donat-
ing might also be associated with a greater tendency to support 
legislation requested by a group. However, i found that campaign 
contributions during the 2008 election cycle were not as closely 
linked to microlegislation as contributions made in 2009 and 2010. 
in addition, data about the members’ staff  and their connections 
(McCrain 2018) or about how interest groups deploy resources 
across stages in the legislative—and regulatory—process might also 
elucidate the opaque, micro-level effects of lobby groups, which a 
growing body of research is identifying (Haeder and yackee 2015; 
Kalla and Broockman 2016). New technological innovations, par-
ticularly greater use of text analysis software, may further enhance 
detection of hidden agreements to provide private benefits. the 
mounting pressure on governments to be transparent should lead 
to greater opportunities to document interest group bias in policy-
making in the form of microlegislation and bargaining, which are 
often difficult to observe. the incentives for lobbyists and officials 
to conceal any quid pro quo relationships require novel data and 
incisive analysis of these actors’ behavior.
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NOTES
 1. see transcript from the committee’s executive session on October 13, 
2009 (https ://www.finan ce.senate.gov/imo/media/ doc/101309.pdf).
 2. according to Chairman Max Baucus as recorded in the transcript, the 
committee never before had released all submitted amendments to a bill it was 
considering (see https ://www.finan ce.senate.gov/imo/media/ doc/101309.pdf).
 3. For 2008–09, the government accountability Office (gaO) estimated 
that 72% of those Ld-203 reports that included contributions, and 97% of 
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reports that did not include contributions, disclosed all contributions as required 
(gaO 2010; the period covered is the second half  of 2008 and the first half  of 
2009). in 2009–10, the comparable numbers were 91% and 98.75% (gaO 2011).
 4. For political and procedural reasons, the Finance Committee’s 
amended bill was then approved verbatim by the House as the Patient Protection 
and affordable Care act—accompanied by House-requested changes in the form 
of a companion bill (the Health Care and education reconciliation act) that 
itself  was not subject to filibuster. this decision was necessary to avoid a vote in 
the senate that, as a result of a mid-term election to replace the late senator ted 
Kennedy, had just 59 democrats. as a result, it is the case that the majority of the 
adopted law was written by the senate Finance Committee.
 5. i later verified these data using the Center for responsive Politics’ 
cleaned and coded versions (http://Opens ecrets.org), with thanks to the Center.
 6. available at http://Opens ecrets.org.
 7. although the dependent variables vary slightly across models, they all 
have a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1; as such, the magnitude of the pre-
dicted effect between contributions and legislative success can justifiably be com-
pared across the three models.
 8. Committee totals come from the Center for responsive Politics. see 
https ://www.opens ecrets.org/congc mtes/overv iew?chamb er=s&cmte=sFiN&c-
mtex ml:id=s12&Cong=111&cycle =2010.
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